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Moral Foundations Theory vs. Schwartz Value Theory: 
Which Theory Best Explains Ideological Differences? 
 
Marissa T. McNeace 
Jeffrey Sinn, Ph.D. (Mentor) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This research examines ideological differences between liberals and conservatives using Schwartz 
Value Theory (SVT) to analyze claims made by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). While MFT 
consists of five scales to measure moral reasoning (Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, 
Purity/Sanctity, Ingroup/Loyalty, and Authority/Respect), SVT consists of ten scales that can be 
grouped into four main categories (Openness to Change, Self-Transcendence, Conservation, and 
Self-Enhancement). Based on SVT, we created four Moral Forces scales (MF4) using the two 
response formats of the MFT. Our scales are the following: Obedience, Status, Universalism, and 
Self-Direction. Data was collected through social media and university classes in the format of 
online and paper surveys. Using stepwise regression, MF4’s scales of Obedience and Universalism 
emerged as the best predictors for self-reported conservatism. For social-issue conservatism, MF4’s 
Obedience and Universalism were also the best predictors that emerged. Lastly, for economic-issue 
conservatism, Fairness from MFT and MF4’s Self-Direction and Universalism emerged as 
predictors. Our findings suggest that the MFT measures the moralization of values rather than moral 
foundations. Additionally, the MF4 identifies moralized values undetected by MFT and thereby 
provides a more accurate picture of liberal-conservative differences. The logic of this is that other 
values can be moralized or translated into the MFT “language” and thus they will be treated as moral 
values. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Both Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) 
and Schwartz Value Theory (SVT) have been 
used to explain ideological beliefs (Graham, 
Haidt, Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011; 
Schwartz et al., 2012; Schwartz et al., 2014). 
This paper focuses in on these two competing 
frameworks for understanding how these values 
and morals influence political ideology. Schein 
and Gray (2015) have challenged MFT’s claim 
to have identified specific moral “foundations” 
(i.e., discrete sensor-like systems attuned to 
specific phenomena) while other theorists 
suggest that SVT might provide an even 
broader framework for recognizing the plurality 
of moral concerns (Schwartz et al., 2014; Sinn, 
2016).  This paper offers a direct comparison of 
the two conceptual schemes by rewriting SVT 
constructs using the response formats of the 
principal MFT measure, the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (MFQ) (Graham et al., 2011). 
 
 
 
Moral Foundations Theory 
Haidt (2008, p.70) defines moral 
systems as interlocking sets of values, practices, 
institutions, and evolved psychological 
mechanisms that work together to suppress or 
regulate selfishness and make social life 
possible”. Haidt here strives to broaden the 
conception of morality beyond the traditional 
focus on harm and fairness. MFT theorists 
suggest three additional moral domains: spiritual 
purity, ingroup loyalty, and respect for authority 
(Haidt, 2008; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; 
Graham et al., 2011). MFT categories the 
traditional morals into the “individualizing” 
foundation, which is made up of two sets of 
moral intuitions of Harm/Care and 
Fairness/Reciprocity (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009). These foundations are called 
“individualizing” because they enable social life 
by protecting the individual. The Harm/Care 
foundation thus reflects values such as 
gentleness, nurturance, and kindness. In other 
words, it arises from attachment processes and 
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enables our ability to empathize with others. 
The Fairness/Reciprocity foundation entails 
altruism, or the selfless concern for others’ well-
being (Graham et al., 2011). 
In the effort to broaden morality, MFT 
defines a “binding” morality. The 5 sets of 
moral intuitions included in the “binding” 
foundation include those in “individualizing” 
foundation plus three others 
(Authority/Respect, Ingroup/Loyalty, and 
Purity/Sanctity) (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009). Authority/Respect concerns 
followership, leadership, and an individual’s 
respect for traditions. Ingroup/Loyalty captures 
a “one for all, all for one” concept, reflected in 
patriotism and personal sacrifice for the good of 
the group. Lastly, Purity/Sanctity addresses 
religious concerns such as living in a “noble” or 
morally uncontaminated way. These added 
moral intuitions in the “binding” foundation 
seek to enable community differently, that is, 
not by protecting individuals (as the 
“individualizing” foundation sees it) but by 
ensuring people put the needs of the 
community first (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009).  
MFT scholars have most famously 
applied their five-factor model to explain 
ideological differences between liberals and 
conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; 
Haidt, 2012). MFT theorists suggest that liberals 
apply a narrower type of morality. In contrast, 
MFT holds that conservatives draw upon a 
broader sense of morality that includes the 
binding foundations. MFT thus suggests that 
different approaches to morality can explain 
liberal-conservative differences (Graham, Haidt, 
& Nosek, 2009). This difference can be seen in 
different understandings of loyalty, such as 
whether one should follow orders given by a 
commanding officer if one finds those orders 
immoral. Conservatives would be more inclined 
to believe that obeying is a moral duty, drawing 
on the “binding” foundation including authority 
and respect as part of moral reasoning (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011). 
Liberals, however, would be more inclined to 
see loyalty as less relevant than their assessment 
of the harm and fairness issues related to the 
orders (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; 
Graham et al., 2011). In other words, liberals 
would be more inclined than conservatives to 
imagine cases where disobeying orders would be 
the moral thing to do. MFT might thus attempt 
to explain ideological distinct reactions to social 
protest movements, such as Black Lives Matter, 
by suggesting that liberals and conservatives’ 
difference in morality oppose such movements 
because they deem respect for authority as a 
moral issue. 
Criticisms of Moral Foundations Theory 
Research has in fact shown that liberal 
and conservatives differ in their endorsement of 
across the five domains of MFT (Graham, 
Haidt, Nosek, 2009). However, others argue 
that MFT is not discovering new differences, 
but merely rebranding or rediscovering well-
established ideological ones. They argue that the 
“binding” foundations simply rebrand Right 
Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and that the 
“individualizing” foundations are simply the 
reverse of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
(Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Sinn, 
n.d.; Sinn & Hayes, 2016). The Dual Process 
Model (DPM) (Duckitt, 2001) presents RWA 
and SDO as the two principle sociopolitical 
attitudes shaping prejudice and ideology. DPM 
theorists view RWA as a type of defensive 
ethnocentrism, which means that RWA reflects 
a desire for cohesion and ethnic devotion that 
entails anti-outgroup attitudes and pro-in-group 
attitudes (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Similarly, the 
“binding” foundations emphasize ingroup 
favoritism and deference to authority (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).  
Similarly, MFT also (accidentally) 
rediscovers SDO. The so-called 
“individualizing” foundations (Harm and 
Fairness) encompass basic concerns related to 
empathy and egalitarianism. These are the very 
sorts of concerns rejected by those scoring high 
on Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
(Duckitt, 2001). Those high in SDO tend to be 
low in empathy, and favor group-based 
dominance and intergroup ethnocentrism. 
Others have also argued that the so-called 
“individualizing” foundations are misnamed, as 
they in fact represent a broader set of concerns 
better labeled as universalism (Sinn & Hayes, 
2016).   
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Schwartz Value Theory 
Schwartz Value Theory (SVT), attempts 
to specify basic human values and the 
relationships among those values (Schwartz, 
1992).  Like MFT, it has been used to explain 
ideological differences (Schwartz et al., 2012; 
Schwartz et al., 2014). It represents ten personal 
values in a circular continuum (see Figure 1). 
The position of values relative to one another 
reflects the relationships among the values. This 
is shown by a positive correlation between 
adjacent values and negative correlations 
between opposing values. For example, 
universalism and benevolence correlate 
positively whereas universalism and power 
correlate negatively. 
 
Figure 1: SVT model of relations among 10 basic 
values (Schwartz, 1992) 
 
The ten values fall along two 
orthogonal axes: conservation vs. openness to change 
and self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence (Schwartz 
1992). Conservation values focus on safety of 
society and self, avoiding conflict, and the 
following of social expectations and norms (e.g. 
security, conformity, tradition). They oppose 
openness to change values which concentrate on 
autonomy and expression (e.g. Self-Direction, 
Stimulation, and partly Hedonism). On the 
other axis, Self-enhancement values emphasize 
control/dominance, personal success, and 
pleasure for oneself (e.g. Power, Achievement, 
and partly Hedonism) and oppose self-
transcending values (e.g. Universalism and 
Benevolence). SVT accurately predicts a range 
of political views (Schwartz et al. 2014). For 
example, the findings show self-transcendence 
values predict support for civil liberties, 
conservation values for blind patriotism, and 
self-enhancement values for free-enterprise.  
Comparing SVT and MFT 
Unlike MFT, SVT recognizes 
fundamental tradeoffs that MFT doesn’t address 
(Schwartz et al., 2012). As suggested in the 
earlier example about the morality of following 
orders, conservatives are inclined to moralize 
loyalty while liberals are not. The SVT suggests 
this tension as conformity and universalism are 
not adjacent. However, MFT treats each 
foundation as independent (Graham, et al., 
2011). It thus does not consider that some 
values may conflict with others. Therefore, 
liberals might not endorse certain MFT 
foundations not because their morality is 
narrower, but because they may endorse values 
MFT ignores.  
SVT may also suggest a more complete 
depiction of conservative motivation by 
considering motivations overlooked by MFT 
(Schwartz et al., 2012). From the SVT 
perspective, what MFT labels “binding” may 
also involve self-enhancement motivations 
(power and achievement; Schwartz, et al., 2012). 
DPM research supports this reasoning as both 
RWA and SDO drive conservatism (Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2010). In short, MFT may be missing an 
SDO motivation behind conservatism.  
SVT also explains liberal motivation 
differently than MFT.  Rejecting the 
“individualizing” label, SVT suggests liberal 
motivation reflects self-transcendence values 
such as benevolence and universalism based 
(Schwartz et al., 2014). This explains why 
liberals are more concerned with nature and 
foreign aid, whereas conservatives are not. This 
potentially could be a better representation of 
liberal motivations than the “individualizing” 
label of MFT because it captures more than 
harm and fairness, which are only part of the 
overall motivations of liberals. Additionally, the 
labeling of “individualizing” might be a poor 
description of what others have argued is a 
broader, more inclusive construct, namely 
universalism (Sinn & Hayes, 2016). Therefore, 
SVT may offer a better framework for 
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understanding both conservative and liberal 
motivations. 
Constructing the Empirical Test 
Based on the above, we can summarize 
the different explanations of ideological 
differences as follows:  MFT suggests liberals 
rely on a narrower set of morals/values while 
SVT argues that different ideologies represent 
tradeoffs between conflicting morals/values.  
To empirically test these competing hypotheses, 
we operationalization SVT in a way that makes 
it directly comparable to the principal measure 
of the MFT, the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham, et al., 2011).  
We make two principal changes.  First, we 
reduce from ten to four the number of SVT 
values so that the five-factor MFT would not be 
disadvantaged by measurement specificity.  We 
identified four values we believed would capture 
the essential tradeoffs driving ideological 
differences.  These were Obedience (reflecting 
Tradition, Conformity, and some Purity), Status 
(Power and Achievement), Universalism, and 
Self-Direction. Second, we wrote items for these 
constructs using the two formats from the 
MFQ (see Methods).  
Operationalizing SVT items in the 
MFQ format will also offer insights into what 
the MFQ is measuring. Utilizing the MFQ 
format for a separate set of constructs will help 
determine the extent to which the MFQ is 
measuring distinct and discrete moral foundations 
or simply one possible set of moralizations from a 
broader set of values. Others have suggested 
that the plurality of moral beliefs requires not 
separate and discrete foundations, but a more 
general process of moralization (Schein & Gray, 
2015). If successful, the operationalization of 
SVT constructs overlooked by MFT (e.g., Self-
Discipline) as “moral” values would undermine 
the “foundational” claims made by MFT. 
Current Study 
To test the competing explanations for 
ideological differences offered by SVT and 
MFT, we created the Moral Forces 4 (i.e., MF4) 
operationalization of SVT values using the 
scales and instructions of the MFQ (Graham, et 
al., 2011; see Methods).  We test the following 
hypotheses: (1) The MF4 scales will (a) show 
acceptable internal reliability, (b) an internal 
pattern of correlations consistent with SVT (i.e., 
positively between Obedience and Status and 
between Universalism and Self-Direction; 
negatively between Obedience and Self-
Direction and between Universalism and 
Status), and (c) correlate with self-reported 
political conservatism (Obedience and Status 
positively, Universalism and Self-Direction 
negatively).  (2) In simultaneous multiple 
regressions predicting self-reported 
conservatism, we predict models based on the 
MFQ and MF4 will account for approximately 
equal amounts of variance (despite the MF4 
having fewer scales).  (3) In stepwise regression 
analyses with all nine scales as potential 
predictors of (a) self-reported conservatism, (b) 
social-issue conservatism, and (c) economic-
issue conservatism, the MF4 scales will account 
for variance unexplained by MFT scales.  
 
METHODS 
Participants 
Respondents were 175 student and non-
student participants. The participants were 
collected through social media and 
undergraduate courses offering extra credit for 
completion. An alternative assignment was 
offered for extra credit for students that did not 
want to participate in the study. We excluded 43 
participants who missed more than one of the 
attention check items embedded within the 
survey, as well as 3 individuals who excluded 
four or more items across the survey, leaving 
129 participants (93 women, 30 men, and 6 
other). Participants identified as Caucasians 
(49.6%), African Americans (32.8%), Multiracial 
(6.1%), Hispanics/Latinos (4.6%), and other 
(6.9%). The average age was 21.05 years 
(SD=6.78). 
Procedure 
The survey was completed either online 
or on paper in class and was self-paced. The 
survey was prefaced with an informed consent 
page. On the online surveys, participants had to 
complete an “instructional manipulation check,” 
or an initial attention check item. This was a 
question about TV viewing that participants 
were instructed to skip. If participants answered, 
they were given a second chance. If they 
answered again, they were unable to continue. 
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Participants may have received extra credit in a 
course; however, no participants were 
financially compensated. A debriefing followed 
the survey. 
Measures 
Our self-report survey contained the 
MFT’s MFQ, our new Moral Forces (MF4) 
scale, self-report measures of economic and 
social conservatism, and demographic 
questions. 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) 
Respondents completed the 30 item 
MFQ (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). This 
included the “individualizing scales,” 
Harm/Care (M=3.89, SD=.69, α=.564) and 
Fairness/Reciprocity (M=3.74, SD=.59, 
α=.511), and the “binding” scales, 
Authority/Respect (M=2.99, SD=.81, α=.595) 
Ingroup/Loyalty (M=2.67, SD=.86, α=.621), 
and Purity/Sanctity (M=2.89, SD=1.03, α=.764) 
with six items per foundation. 
Moral Forces 
We created a Moral Forces scale (MF4) 
based on SVT (Schwartz, 1992). We first 
identified four composite constructs we 
expected to be particularly relevant for 
predicting political ideology. These were 
Obedience (Conformity and Tradition), Status 
(Power and Achievement), Universalism, and 
Self-Direction. The obedience scale was 
designed to capture RWA motivations and the 
“binding” foundations of MFT 
(Authority/Respect, Ingroup/Loyalty, and 
Purity/Sanctity). Status was designed to capture 
SDO-related motivations opposing 
universalizing. Universalism was designed to 
capture that SVT construct plus Harm/Care 
and Fairness/Reciprocity, or the 
“individualizing” foundations. Lastly, Self-
Direction was designed to capture that SVT 
construct and to oppose Obedience. We wrote 
two sets of separate items for each scale 
utilizing the two response formats of the MFQ 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).  We wrote the 
MF4 scale items using the two response formats 
of the MFQ (Graham, et al., 2011), moral 
relevance and moral judgment. For the moral 
relevance questions, participants were instructed 
to respond to the following question: “When 
you decide whether something is right or wrong, 
to what extent are the following considerations 
relevant to your thinking? Please rate using a 
Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all relevant) to 
5 (extremely relevant)”. For the moral judgment 
items, participants were told to respond to the 
following statement: Please read the following 
sentences and indicate your disagreement or 
agreement for each statement using a Likert 
Scale ranging from 0 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree). 
Following SVT methodology, the 
participants’ responses were centered based on 
their average responses.  We then administered 
these 48 items in the survey and conducted a 
reliability analysis on for each scale, picking the 
top three items in each format for each scale. 
This left us with six questions per scale (three 
per format) with the following reliabilities: 
Obedience (α=.802), Status (α=.709), 
Universalism (α=.755), and Self-Direction 
(α=.777). 
Economic Conservatism and Social Conservatism 
We wrote items to measure this 
construct based on how people responded to 
issues, with some coming from Everett (2013) 
and others constructed and written by us. The 
issues used for economic conservatism were 
raising the minimum wage, welfare benefits, and 
higher taxes on the wealthy. These items were 
all reverse scored. The issues used for social 
conservatism were: always siding with your 
country (right or wrong), patriotism, sex 
education in public schools (reverse scored), 
safe and convenient access to abortion (reverse 
scored) and preventing Muslim immigration.  
Participants responded to the question of 
“Please indicate your level of agreement with 
the following items” using a Likert scale of 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 10 (Strongly Agree). This 
left us with the following reliabilities: Economic 
Conservative Issues (M= 3.76, SD= 1.97, α= 
.683) and Social Conservation Issues (M= 3.75, 
SD=1.76, α= .763). 
Demographics 
Participants reported their state of 
residence, the size of their home town/city, 
their education level, household income, race, 
gender, age, religious affiliation and self-rated 
political ideology (overall, social, and economic) 
from 1 (Strongly Liberal) to 7 (Strongly 
 35 
Conservative) or 8 (Libertarian, other, don’t 
know). 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
Table 1 compares correlations between 
MFQ and MF4 scales with self-reported 
conservatism. All five MFT scales correlated 
significantly, except Harm, replicating previous 
results (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). 
Similarly, all MF4 scales correlated with 
conservatism. Similar patterns are seen with 
scales of economic- and social-issue 
conservatism. Additionally, the pattern of 
correlations among the MF4 scales are 
consistent with the circumplex structure of 
SVT; both Obedience and Status correlate 
positively, r (129) =.243, p =.005, as do 
Universalism and Self-direction, r (129) =.387, p 
<.001. In contrast, both Status and 
Universalism correlate negatively, r (129) =-
.687, p <.001, as do Obedience and Self-
direction, r (129) = -.596, p <.001. 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows simultaneous regression 
analyses for both the MFQ and MF4 scales. 
Among the MFQ scales, only Fairness and 
Purity reached significance. Among the MF4 
scales, only Universalism and Obedience 
reached significance. Overall variance accounted 
for was similar between the MFQ, R2=.45, and 
the MF4, R2=.43. The F for MF4 was slightly 
larger, F (4,92) =17.2, than for the MFQ, F 
(5,92) =14.9. 
Tables 3 through 5 present stepwise 
regressions predicting three different 
operationalizations of conservativism.  In each 
step, the regression analysis chooses the next 
best predictor from all remaining MFQ and 
MFT scales to maximize the overall amount of 
variance explained.   
 
 
 
Table 3 examines self-reported 
conservatism.  Here the M4 scales of Obedience 
and Universalism emerged as the best 
predictors, but the MFQ scales of Fairness and 
Harm also accounted for unique variance.  
 
 
 
Table 4 examines social-issue 
conservatism. Once again Obedience and 
Universalism were the best predictors followed 
by the MFQ scales of Loyalty and Fairness. 
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Table 5 examines economic-issue 
conservatism.  Here the MFQ scale of Fairness 
was the best predicted, but the MF4 scales of 
Self-Direction and Universalism also improved 
the model fit. 
 
DISCUSSION 
MFT claims to have broadened morality 
and explained differing ideological beliefs with 
their five discrete, quasi-physiological sensors of 
morality. As hypothesized in Hypothesis 1a, 
MF4 scales did show acceptable internal 
reliability, and correlated with self-reported 
political conservatism. This suggests that our 
measure does indeed predict the endorsement 
of political conservatism. Alongside this, we 
successfully replicated the correlations between 
the MFT foundations and self-identified 
conservatism, excluding harm (Graham, Haidt, 
& Nosek, 2009). Within this, a substantial 
correlation (r = -.359) was found between 
Fairness and conservatism. MFT theorists claim 
that conservatives have a broader morality than 
liberals because they utilize all the “Moral 
Foundations” roughly equally. However, the 
fact that the negative correlation between 
Fairness and conservatism is substantially larger 
than zero suggests that conservatives are 
endorsing it substantially less. This disputes 
MFT’s claim that conservatives utilize the five 
foundations more equally. This also supports 
the trade-off logic underlying SVT (Schwartz, et 
al., 2012). However, the reliabilities of the MFT 
scales (Harm/Care, α=.564, 
Fairness/Reciprocity, α=.511, 
Authority/Respect, α=.595, Ingroup/Loyalty, 
α=.621, and Purity/Sanctity, α=.764) are low, 
calling into question the coherence of these 
constructs. Overall, the MF4 scales performed 
better. First, the MF4 scales showed better 
reliabilities (Obedience, α=.802, Status, α=.709, 
Universalism, α=.755, and Self-Direction, 
α=.777). 
  Second, as predicted in Hypothesis 1b, 
the pattern of relationships among the MF4 
measures fit the tradeoff pattern expected for, 
with Obedience and Status correlating 
positively, Obedience and Self-Direction 
correlating negatively, Self-Direction and 
Universalism correlating positively, and Status 
and Universalism correlating negatively. Third, 
as predicted in Hypothesis 1c, each scale within 
the MF4 correlates with self-reported 
conservatism. This suggests that MFT may not 
have identified the only relevant moral 
differences between liberals and conservatives 
and that the MFQ may be measuring 
moralization, rather than functionally discrete 
“foundations.”  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the MF4 
and MFQ would account for about equal 
amounts of variance in self-reported ideology.  
As shown in Table 2, this hypothesis was 
supported.  While the MFQ accounted for 45% 
of the variance, the MF4 accounted for 43%.  In 
both cases, only two of the predictors reach 
significance (i.e., Fairness and Purity for MFQ, 
Universalism and Obedience for MF4). 
However, we note that the F value is higher for 
the MF4, because it requires fewer degrees of 
freedom. Given the importance MFT gives to 
parsimony (Graham et al., 2011), this difference 
is important. Our analyses here suggest that 
MF4’s four factor theory explains almost as 
much variance as the MFQ with a smaller 
number of factors. Additionally, the success of 
our alternative set of scales calls into question 
MFT’s presumption of having discovered 
“foundational” differences and suggests instead 
that a range of moral values can be moralized 
differently between liberals and conservatives.   
Our result also undermines MFT in finding 
Fairness the best predictor of conservatism.   
This negative relationship undermines the MFT 
assertion that liberals and conservatives endorse 
the “individualizing” foundations roughly 
equally (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The 
only reason this set of predictors can account 
for 45% of the variance is due to Fairness, a 
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predictor that MFT suggests should be near 
zero.  
To better understand the predictive 
utility of each set of scales, we also conducted 
three stepwise hierarchical regressions 
predicting in turn self-reported conservative, 
social-issue conservatism and economic-issue 
conservatism.  As we predicted in Hypothesis 
3a, some of the MF4 scales emerged as better 
predictors of self-reported conservatism relative 
to the MFQ scales. The MF4 scales of 
Obedience and Universalism appear to be 
potent predictors for self-reported 
conservatism, emerging as the best two 
predictors before the MFQ’s Fairness and 
Harm. This suggests that MFT underspecifies 
the exact moral differences between liberals and 
conservatives. This also suggests that describing 
liberal morality as “individualizing” may not e 
accurate given the predictive value of 
Universalism.  We note in passing that Harm 
likely performed differently (loading positively) 
given that two of the original Harm items were 
dropped to improve the scale’s reliability.   
The results also supported Hypothesis 
3b, which predicted MF4 scales would emerge 
as predictors of social-issue conservatism. Once 
again, MF4’s scales of Obedience and 
Universalism emerged and accounted for more 
variance than MFT’s Loyalty and Fairness. We 
do note, however, that even after Obedience is 
entered, MFQ’s Loyalty emerges as the third 
best predictor of social conservatism. This 
suggests that the Loyalty scale captures 
something relevant to conservatives that our 
Obedience scale fails to address.  
  As hypothesized in Hypothesis 2c, MF4 
scales accounted for variance unexplained by 
MFT scales in issue-based economic 
conservatism. MFT’s Fairness is important, but 
so are MF4’s Self-Direction and Universalism. 
No “binding” factors emerged as significant. 
This suggests that neither “binding” nor 
obedience concerns drive economic 
conservatism, but that rejecting fairness, self-
direction, and universalism do.  The fact that no 
positive predictor emerged as a predictor of 
economic conservatism also suggests that 
conservative morality here is narrower rather 
than broader relative to liberal morality. 
Additionally, only Universalism and 
Fairness were significant predictors across all 
three operationalization’s of conservatism.  The 
fact that these were always negative predictors 
calls into question the idea that conservatives 
have a broader morality than liberals. 
Overall, our results offer a strong 
corrective to MFT’s claim to explain ideological 
differences. Our ability to translate SVT 
constructs into “morality” scales based on the 
two MFQ formats suggests that MFT has not 
discovered the root causes of liberal-
conservative differences. By showing that other 
values can be moralized in the same fashion as 
the MFQ scales suggests that the MFQ might 
instead be detecting differences in moralizations 
rather the key “foundations” of morality. Our 
results also suggest that MFT is incomplete as a 
model of the moral oral differences between 
liberals and conservatives. Obedience and 
Universalism (reversed) appear to be potent 
(arguably better) predictors of conservatism. 
More takeaways from this study include 
the general pattern of multiple scales acting as 
negative predictors for conservatism, such as 
Universalism, Self-Direction, etc. This suggests 
that MFT is wrong in its claim that 
conservatives have a broader morality. Instead, 
it suggests conservatism entails the rejection of 
moral concerns. Our findings also provide 
additional support for previous critics of MFT 
as a model of ideological differences (Federico, 
Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Sinn, n.d.; Sinn & 
Hayes, 2016). More specifically, these studies 
discuss MFT missing the following critical 
factor in liberal motives: Universalism (Sinn & 
Hayes, 2016). 
We should note, however, that we 
found little evidence in the stepwise directions 
for a role of the MF4 Status scale in predicting 
conservatism. This might suggest that the 
moralization of status is less important than 
other concerns.  Alternatively, it could be that a 
better set of items, perhaps more focused on 
power, could produce a scale that would 
perform better. Additionally, Status may too 
closely reflect an opposing set of values relative 
to Universalism such that its predictive power is 
overwhelmed by that of Universalism. 
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LIMITATIONS 
  Our results would be stronger if 
replicated in a more diverse sample.  A large 
part of our sample came from those who had 
just taken a general sociology course. This 
course explores topics such as poverty, power, 
inequality and other topics that could impact the 
scope and nature of moral reasoning. Our study 
also used issue-based measures that were based 
on a relatively small set of items. A broader set, 
or separate set, of items might reveal different 
results. Finally, experimental work is needed to 
better understand the causal nature of the 
relationships our data suggests. One cannot 
assume that what our findings suggest as truth 
until it is future explored. This could be seen in 
the example of seeing if there are experiences 
(such as taking a sociology course, as previously 
stated) that might increase the levels of 
universalism over time. 
  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
  For future studies, the idea of 
replicating this study in a different type of 
sample would be good to confirm if our 
findings are generalizable to populations other 
than college students. Alongside this, one could 
also do an exploratory factor analysis with all 
the items within the MF4 and MFT. This would 
possibly let us see if we can simplify down the 
nine scales. It could be that some of the current 
factors could be combined (e.g., Obedience, 
Purity, and Authority might load on one factor). 
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